INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama explained to a crowd in the Ronald Regan building that the United States had recently "faced the worst recession since the Great Depression." 1 He was referring to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 ("financial crisis"), when "[t]ens of millions saw the value of their homes and retirement savings plummet" and countless businesses were unable to get the loans they needed, forcing many "to shut their doors." 2 Of course, the financial devastation was not contained to the United States, as people around the world suffered. 3 In the aftermath of the 2. Id.
3. See Directorate-Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Affairs, European Comm'n, Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, EUR. ECON., Sept. 2009, at 1, 1 ("EU real GDP is projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in its history."); see financial crisis, it became apparent that there was no singular cause. 4 Yet no group was more publicly vilified for its role than large financial companies. 5 Many companies had speculated with over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. 6 They lost tremendous sums, while spreading financial damage through the interconnected global markets they had created. 7 President Obama cited a "failure of responsibility, from certain corners of Wall Street to the halls of power in Washington," as the primary cause of the financial crisis. 8 In 2009, leaders from the G20 9 governments met to discuss the financial crisis and to create legislation that would both better regulate their financial markets and prevent another crisis. 10 Ultimately, they decided each jurisdiction would enact its own legislation based upon "shared policy objectives" 11 rather than a supranational approach by the entire G20. 12 In 7. See Gilani, supra note 6. 8. Obama, supra note 1. 9. See generally Jamil Mustafa, What Is the G20 and How Does It Work?, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20-summit/5075115/G20-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work.html [https://perma.cc/TMK9-PHS3]. The G20 members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union. Id. 10. See generally Leaders' Statement, G-20, The Pittsburg Summit 1 (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_ summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY3W-TJXB].
11. Id. at 6.
the United States, this G20 commitment resulted in the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 13 ("DoddFrank Act" or "Dodd-Frank").
The shared policy objectives of the G20 led to similar legislation across its jurisdictions, which in turn created an issue for buyers and sellers of OTC derivatives ("market participants"). 14 During cross-border transactions, market participants must comply with legal requirements that are duplicative and not quite uniform, and the totality of compliance threatens to undermine the profitability of their OTC derivatives businesses. 15 The American agencies charged with regulating the OTC derivatives market under Dodd-Frank, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or "the Commission"), then faced their own issue. They could maintain the new legal landscape for OTC derivatives, and potentially dampen the productivity of the American economy, 16 or they could grant some relief to the OTC derivatives industry, including many vilified financial companies, and hope that their actions would not result in another financial crisis. 17 The CFTC chose to grant relief through "substituted compliance" determinations for eight foreign jurisdictions. 18 Substituted compliance allows certain sellers of OTC derivatives to satisfy American legal requirements by satisfying another jurisdiction's requirements. 19 In 2013, the SEC announced it would also consider a substituted compliance scheme, but to date it has not made any determinations. 20 This Note argues that the SEC should make a substituted compliance determination, allowing certain financial companies to substitute their compliance with European OTC derivatives laws for their compliance with equivalent American laws. 21 Though this would grant relief to financial companies partially responsible for the financial crisis, it is a compromise that addresses the legitimate issues these companies currently face, the intentions of the G20, and the purposes of Dodd-Frank, including protecting the financial markets and preventing another crisis. 22 Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis and the different approaches taken by the United States and the European Union to prevent a recurrence of the last crisis. Part II then outlines the arguments in favor and against a substituted compliance regime for the regulation of OTC derivatives. Finally, Part III proposes a method of substituted compliance for certain market participants 12 in a way that balances the risks, rewards, and goals of OTC derivatives regulation.
I. HOW THEY GOT TO SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE Though dealers and end users, known collectively as counterparties, use OTC derivatives to mitigate risks, their speculative use by some counterparties, especially in cross-border transactions, contributed significantly to the financial crisis. 23 As discussed, the resulting legislation in G20 jurisdictions created cross-border issues that led to the crossroads the SEC faces regarding substituted compliance. 24 Part I.A begins with a summary of the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis. Part I.B surveys the legal responses to the financial crisis in the United States, beginning with the response of the CFTC and moving to that of the SEC. Finally, Part I.C surveys the European Union's legal response.
A. OTC Derivatives and Their Role in the Financial Crisis
OTC derivatives 25 are privately negotiated bilateral contracts that trade without an intermediary between the counterparties. 26 Historically, there was no centralized oversight of OTC derivatives markets and little government regulation, 27 as counterparties used OTC derivatives primarily to mitigate risks through hedging. 28 In the years leading up to the financial crisis, however, some large financial institutions in these decentralized and unregulated markets used substantial amounts of OTC derivatives to speculate. 29 These speculative derivatives predominantly had forms of credit as the underlying asset. 30 obligation" 31 (CDO) and a subform of the generic "swap," 32 referred to as the "credit-default swap" 33 (CDS).
In the United States, financial firms purchased these credit derivatives with mortgages as the underlying form of credit. 34 When the American real estate bubble burst in 2008, borrowers defaulted on the mortgage payments underlying the derivatives, which led speculative purchasers to default on their payments to other counterparties. 35 Given the substantial speculative position of some financial institutions, 36 losses on credit derivatives rendered some of them insolvent and threatened the solvency of others. 37 This led to fears of runs on the financial institutions and, ultimately, to bailouts of some institutions by the federal government. 38 Often, these credit derivatives were cross-border transactions, 39 which exposed American financial institutions to the credit risk of foreign counterparties and foreign counterparties to the risk of insolvent American institutions. 40 The market was interconnected globally. 41 Cross-border OTC derivatives were the lynchpin of a systemic risk that threatened a global financial contagion. 42 The 2009 summit of G20 leaders was an attempt to address the structural issues stemming from the financial crisis, including those caused by OTC 31. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304-06. 32. In a "swap" derivative transaction, counterparties agree to exchange payments based on the value of an underlying asset over time. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1295. Swaps involve at least two risks: (1) the fluctuation in value of the underlying assets and (2) the possibility that one counterparty will become insolvent and fail to complete payment under the contract. Id. at 1300.
33. See Gilani, supra note 6. Counterparties agree to receive interest payments in exchange for insuring against the default of an underlying form of credit (typically a loan or bond). See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1298-99. However, counterparties do not need to lend the money for the underlying credit form; thus, CDSs allow counterparties to speculate on any form of credit more easily. Id To realize the G20 goals for the OTC derivatives market, Congress enacted Title VII of Dodd-Frank, 47 which amended the Commodity Exchange Act 48 and the Securities Exchange Act. 49 Through Dodd-Frank, Congress split regulatory jurisdiction over derivatives between the CFTC and the SEC based on the underlying asset of the product. 50 The CFTC would have jurisdiction over swaps, while the SEC would have jurisdiction over "security-based swaps" (SBSs). 51 Because the SEC regulates the underlying securities, Congress granted oversight over SBSs to the SEC, rather than the CFTC. 52 Though swaps and SBSs are economically similar, 53 the split reflected the CFTC's and SEC's existing jurisdictional scopes. 54 Congress also mandated that the SEC and CFTC fully define the entities and transactions described in Title VII. 55 43. Leaders 55. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1) (directing the CFTC and the SEC to further define the terms "swap," "security-based swap," and "swap dealer").
To fulfill their obligations under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC and SEC had to define the limits and requirements applicable to OTC derivatives counterparties and determine the operation of those requirements to counterparties during cross-border transactions. 56 Part I.B.1 below summarizes the CFTC's resulting regulatory scheme and cross-border approach. Part I.B.2 analyzes the SEC's regulations in-depth, while Part I.B.3 summarizes the SEC's application of its requirements to cross-border SBSs.
The CFTC's Regulations and Cross-Border Approach
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC eschewed formal rulemaking and adopted a regulatory framework through interpretive guidance and policy statements that created a set of responsibilities for swaps counterparties. 57 It then asserted a general policy that these requirements may apply to cross-border swaps with a "direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States." 58 Though the application of these requirements would be flexible, 59 the CFTC intended to regulate crossborder transactions that posed risks to the U.S. economy. 60 The result of the CFTC's policy was that foreign counterparties often were subject to the CFTC's requirements when they transacted with American counterparties. 61 The CFTC focused on harmonization with other regulators, as it recognized that the swaps market would be regulated for the first time. 62 This included consultation with the SEC "in an effort to increase understanding of each other's regulatory approaches and to harmonize the cross-border approaches of the two agencies." 63 The agencies' objective was to coordinate their cross-border approaches "to the greatest extent 56 65 The CFTC also coordinated with international regulators before releasing its cross-border guidance. 66 In pursuit of global harmonization, the CFTC instituted a substituted compliance regime. 67 Substituted compliance allows foreign counterparties in cross-border transactions to satisfy CFTC regulatory requirements by satisfying their home jurisdiction's regulatory requirements. 68 As part of this regime, the CFTC issued informal comparability determinations between its regulatory requirements and those of foreign jurisdictions. 69 Regulators in the United States had narrowly used substituted compliance before, 70 so the CFTC's determinations were not novel. 71 The CFTC intended its framework to allow foreign regulators latitude for their regulatory interests 72 swaps. 75 Like the CFTC, the SEC requires counterparties to register with it, 76 report information to data repositories, 77 and maintain minimum levels of capital 78 and margin. 79 The reporting, recordkeeping, capital, and margin requirements are analyzed below.
a. Capital and Margin Requirements
Of the requirements mandated by Dodd-Frank, and derivatives regulations globally, capital and margin requirements are especially important to commenters. 80 Independent "third-party custodian[s]" hold the capital and margin funds that counterparties allocate for SBSs in segregated accounts. 81 The more counterparties allocate funds to satisfy these requirements, the fewer funds they have to complete new SBS transactions. 82 Therefore, duplicative capital and margin requirements can be administratively inconvenient and profit suppressing for counterparties. 83 The SEC's capital and margin requirements for SBSs are proposed but not finalized. 84 Under the proposed capital rules, SBS dealers would be subject to a separate rule, not applicable to other securities dealers, that would protect customer assets and mitigate the risks of counterparty failure while allowing firms flexibility in how they conduct business. 85 This standalone rule would impose a "net liquid assets" test on all SBS dealers, requiring the dealers to maintain a minimum level of net capital at all times. 86 More generally, the capital rules impose substantially higher minimum capital requirements for SBS dealers because the use of internal models for proprietary transactions can "substantially reduce" some standardized deductions prescribed by the rules. 87 The Commission is especially concerned with the ways SBS dealers value their transactions and prescribe capital based off these valuations because of risks that the SBS dealers will fail to properly value transactions. 88 There are also higher minimum requirements for dealers who engage in brokerage activities, as compared to those who engage solely in dealing, because of the substantial increase in importance and risk of brokerage activities in the securities market. 89 For its SBS margin requirements, the SEC also based its approach off of preexisting broker-dealer requirements. 90 The Commission acknowledged it was imposing margin requirements on OTC SBS dealers for the first 86. Id. at 70,219 ("This standard is designed to promote liquidity; the rule allows a broker-dealer to engage . . . in a manner that places the firm in the position of holding at all times more than one dollar of highly liquid assets for each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities (e.g., money owed to customers, counterparties, and creditors)."). Net capital is highly liquid capital, reserves of cash, or liquid securities. Id. The net capital test requires the dealer to determine how much net capital it must maintain over how much it is maintaining. Id. The minimum amount of net capital is the "greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in the rule and an amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios," either a fifteento-one aggregate debt to net capital ratio or a 2 percent of aggregate debit items ratio. Id. In computing net capital, dealers also would have to make a number of adjustments and deductions, including taking prescribed percentage deductions from mark-to-market proprietary positions that are included in its tentative net capital. Id.
87. Id. 88. Id. Since dealers have an important position in the SBS market, and, therefore, have an increased capacity for perpetuating systemic market risk, they are subject to a more stringent net liquid asset test than other market participants. Id. at 70,220 (discussing test for MSBSPs).
89. Id. at 70,228 (stating that broker-dealers are important intermediaries and that their internal models are more risk sensitive, but may not capture all risks). For those dealers who engage solely in dealing, there is a $20 million fixed dollar minimum and $100 million tentative net capital requirement, as compared to a $1 billion fixed dollar minimum and $5 billion tentative net capital requirement for dealers who also engage in brokerage activities. time. 91 Under these rules, counterparties would have to maintain a specified level of their transacting partner's equity in a securities account, which they could liquidate to satisfy obligations in instances of nonpayment. 92 The amount of required funds depends on the nature of the transaction and its accompanying risk. 93
b. Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements
The SEC announced a number of significant reporting and recordkeeping requirements for SBS counterparties in a 2013 release, 94 some of which were adopted in Regulation SBSR. 95 Under these requirements, a counterparty must establish, document, and maintain a comprehensive "system of internal risk management controls to assist in managing the risks associated with its business." 96 They must also implement internal systems and controls that establish and enforce procedures to obtain any necessary information to perform required functions under the Securities Exchange Act and provide this information to the SEC. 97 Building off of these requirements, the SEC requires that counterparties keep books and records of all activities related to their SBS business and report these books and records to the Commission. 98 In addition to reporting, counterparties must keep their books and records open to the SEC for inspection and examination, 99 exercise diligent supervision, 100 and ensure there are no conflicts of interest with their clients. 101 They must also have a chief compliance officer and adhere to licensing requirements and 91. Id. at 70,258 (stating that there would be margin requirements for all SBSs that are not cleared). Under Dodd-Frank, the Commission will impose initial and variation margin. Id. The initiative was to address the fact that some dealers "experienced large uncollateralized exposures to counterparties experiencing financial difficulty, which, in turn, risked exacerbating the already severe market dislocation" during the financial crisis. As the CFTC decided with swaps, 105 the SEC elected to subject any transactions involving an American counterparty to the above requirements for its cross-border approach. 106 Therefore, when transacting with American counterparties, foreign SBS counterparties had to comply with SEC requirements. 107 The Commission stated this approach was "grounded in the text of" Dodd-Frank 108 but also acknowledged that "cross-border transactions are the norm, not the exception." 109 Under the SEC's cross-border approach, foreign counterparties transacting in the United States, and American counterparties transacting abroad, faced potentially duplicative requirements if another jurisdiction's requirements were equivalent to those of the SEC. 110 efficiency. 111 Therefore, the Commission announced that it would consider adopting its own substituted compliance framework to address this issue. 112 At adoption of its cross-border guidance, however, the Commission stated, "we expect to address issues regarding the availability of substituted compliance as part of future rulemakings" in conjunction with the crossborder application of specific rules. 113 It had previously listed the necessary Title VII requirements for a substituted compliance determination. 114 In its proposed capital and margin guidance, the Commission did not mention substituted compliance, 115 but it has addressed the topic in subsequent releases. 116 Though it reviewed the CFTC's substituted compliance scheme, 117 the SEC ultimately decided it would only allow substituted compliance in a different form. 118 118. Id. at 31,088. Instead of providing informal interpretive guidance like that of the CFTC, see supra Part I.B.1, the SEC would undertake formal rulemakings to determine the availability of substituted compliance generally and whether specific jurisdictions would qualify for it. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,087-88. The Commission may only allow substituted compliance after it determines that foreign requirements are "comparable" to those of the SEC, id. at 30,088, and are accompanied by effective supervisory and enforcement programs, id. at 31,088 n.1119. It also would require other jurisdictions' regulations. 119 The Commission stated it would focus on "regulatory outcomes as a whole." 120 Using its "holistic," "outcomesbased" approach, the Commission would have to conclude that another jurisdiction had the "reporting of data elements comparable to those required" by the Commission. 121 It did not, however, assess the equivalence of any foreign SBS regulations to its own. 122 Currently, it has neither made any substituted compliance determinations nor declared whether it will make any determinations. 123 
C. The European Legal Response to OTC Derivatives After the Financial Crisis
The European Union, unlike the United States, regulated a small portion of the OTC derivatives market prior to the financial crisis through its Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID 1). 124 In 2012, however, the European Union enacted the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) to focus on OTC derivatives pursuant to the 2009 G20 agreements, 125 along with three directives specifically focused on OTC derivatives. 126 EMIR implemented several requirements, including information and recordkeeping requirements. 127 and a directive 129 created counterparty capital requirements. 130 The European Union later amended EMIR through a regulation known as "MiFIR," 131 and then enacted "MiFID 2," 132 a companion directive to MiFIR that goes into effect January 3, 2018. 133 Finally, there are proposed regulatory technical standards for counterparty margin requirements under EMIR. 134 Pursuant to the 2009 G20 Summit, these European regulations and directives established a framework for OTC derivatives dealers similar to regulatory frameworks enacted in the United States as a result of DoddFrank. 135 Furthermore, regulators in the United States and European Union discussed their OTC derivatives frameworks as the process unfolded. 136 As discussed in Part I.B.3, to allow substituted compliance, the SEC must find the laws of a foreign jurisdiction equivalent to the requirements described in Part I.B.2. To that end, Part I.C.1-2 summarize the European regulations and directives that the SEC would analyze for a substituted compliance determination. As with the SEC's regulations in Part I.B.2, Part I.C.1 summarizes the European capital and margin requirements first, while Part I.C.2 summarizes the remaining requirements.
Capital and Margin Requirements
The European Union recently proposed new margin requirements for OTC derivatives in a public consultation. 137 Therefore, between the United States and the European Union, the European capital requirements are the only enacted laws or regulations for either capital or margin. 138 However, these requirements are similar to the SEC's proposed capital requirements in that they require counterparties maintain a minimum level of net capital in a standalone rule. 139 They also bring the capital requirements in line with the Basel Accords, which generally require financial firms to maintain higher levels of capital. 140 Additionally, the E.U. laws focus on the risks associated with the use of internal models 141 and prudent valuation of transactions overall. 142 In its proposed margin consultation, the European Union acknowledged it would be introducing margin requirements for OTC derivatives. 143 It also described the different forms of collateral available, and it stated the importance of risk management for its margin requirements. 144 
Remaining Requirements
The European Union's risk management systems provisions are located in articles 9 and 11 of EMIR, 145 article 16 of MiFID 2, 146 and Regulation 1247 of 2012. 147 There are numerous provisions for internal systems and control mechanisms as well. 148 As for SBS books and records, the European Union requires counterparties to maintain that information through EMIR, 149 three other regulations, 150 152 The SEC requires that counterparties exercise diligent supervision. 153 Counterparties in the European Union must "establish, maintain, and enforce a system to supervise . . . diligently[] its business and its associated persons" 154 through applicable E.U. laws. 155 Articles 16.3 and 23 of MiFID 2 further mandate that counterparties take care to avoid conflicts of interest. 156 MiFID 2 also requires that the managers of counterparties define and oversee "the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management" of the firm, and that management be involved in compliance issues. 157 Regulatory agencies in the European Union also reserve the right to refuse authorization for members of management to work if they are not of sufficiently good repute, or do not possess sufficient knowledge and experience, among other qualifications. 158 Finally, under article 16 of MiFID 2, counterparties in the European Union are required to protect clients, make information available to them regarding their transactions, and separate client assets from their own accounts. 159 These are similar to the SEC's two transaction-level requirements for counterparties, external business conduct standards, 160 and the segregation of assets. 161 
II. THE UNITED STATES DECIDED OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD GET OFF ITS OTC-DERIVATIVES REGULATORY LAWN
The CFTC and SEC broadly applied their cross-border requirements for similar reasons. 162 They intended to remedy certain realities: (1) major financial firms can escape regulation of their higher-risk operations by moving them to foreign jurisdictions; (2) successful regulation of systemic risk requires regulation of both counterparties to a trade; (3) some nations will profit from assuming the risks of nonregulation, creating "regulatory arbitrage"; 163 and (4) only major financial jurisdictions can push international bodies and foreign jurisdictions, by leveraging territorial jurisdiction. 164 As the SEC itself stated, however, the OTC derivatives market is highly international, 165 and substituted compliance could ease the burden of duplicative requirements for counterparties in cross-border transactions. 166 The Commission must, therefore, balance the motivations for its territorial approach against the benefits of substituted compliance in deciding whether to allow it and in what form. The decision of whether to allow substituted compliance for SBS counterparties, and in what form, is the central issue of this Note.
Support for and against substituted compliance lies across a spectrum. There are some SBS industry members who urge the SEC to grant substituted compliance broadly in their comment letters. 167 Some 168 On the other end of the spectrum, the SEC also received comment letters opposing any sort of substituted compliance determinations by the Commission. 169 In the middle, at least one academic advocates for a diversity of regulatory forms in the OTC derivatives market, a concept both in support of, and opposed to, an SEC substituted compliance scheme. 170 These three main positions are summarized, in turn, in Part II.A, II.B, and II.C.
A. Profits for All: Why the SEC Should Broadly Grant Substituted Compliance
Often, participants of any industry have the operational knowledge to anticipate problems that regulators cannot. To this end, some SBS market participants argue in favor of substituted compliance. Some academics also favor substituted compliance, and their arguments may be more convincing as they are not self-interested market participants.
Arguments from Market Participants
Many of the commenters that advocate for substituted compliance are financial industry advocacy groups. 171 These lobbyists promote the interests of a set of diverse financial services clients, including both dealers and purchasers of SBSs. 172 Already familiar with substituted compliance from the CFTC, they favored the possibility of substituted compliance with the SEC. 173 As the cross-border aspects of SEC regulations increase, and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 11-13 (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ comments/s7-02-13/s70213-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4R-RMZK].
168. See infra Part II.A.2. Many of these academics' arguments focus on the CFTC's substituted compliance regime, rather than an SEC scheme. Their arguments are mainly over the substance and philosophy of the concept of substituted compliance, however, and not the form of the SEC or CFTC schemes. These arguments are applicable to the SEC's framework because the Commission has many of the same reasons for substituted compliance as the CFTC.
169. 173. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 2 (addressing "the need for harmonization with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission" and the SEC regarding its proposal of substituted compliance). commenters continue to request substituted compliance during rulemaking periods. 174 Their advocacy of substituted compliance is motivated by economic concerns of overregulation with the SEC's territorial approach to crossborder transactions. 175 These groups argue that Dodd-Frank's SBSs requirements and those of foreign regulators are substantially similar and, in practice, duplicative. 176 When counterparties are required to comply with the same requirements in multiple jurisdictions, no additional protections result, and the extra work inhibits the flow of transactions. 177 The SEC could solve these business problems by establishing a comprehensive substituted compliance framework. 178 Additionally, substituted compliance would "foster reciprocity and mutual recognition" between the SEC and foreign regulators. 179 Finally, if American counterparties retreat from the global market because of their unwillingness to comply with duplicative requirements, it could fragment the markets for SBSs into an American tier and a foreign tier. 180 This would decrease the overall liquidity of the global market. 181 Either result could expose the American economy to systemic , https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-20.pdf ("Non-U.S. market participants may not wish to subject themselves to the increased burden and complexity of U.S. regulation when dealing with non-U.S. counterparties, particularly as they may be subject to comparable regulation in their home jurisdictions.") [https://perma.cc/Y3QD-TVHJ].
178. Some in the academic community also argue against the SEC's territorial approach to OTC derivatives regulations. 183 Instead, they propose broader and internationally integrated approaches such as harmonization, mutual recognition, and minilateralism. 184 Although the academics who argue for these approaches may not advocate for substituted compliance specifically, 185 these approaches have justifications analogous to those for substituted compliance. 186 
a. Harmonization
In cross-border regulatory systems, harmonization seeks to "achieve substantial similarity in multiple regulatory systems so that market participants face no additional burden in pursuing cross-border activities." 187 To begin, harmonization includes a step fundamental to any substituted compliance determination 188 : the bilateral assessment to determine the compatibility of the regulations of two jurisdictions. 189 This assessment may require discussions to help ensure that no regulatory gaps or systemic risks exist. 190 After the initial assessment, efforts by the regulators of the two jurisdictions to close gaps between frameworks and make them more similar, or even equivalent, is "harmonization." 191 Harmonization,
182. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1260 ("This is because major financial institutions are not only 'too big to fail' but also 'too interconnected to fail.'"). 186. See infra Part II.A.2. 187. Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 308. Greene and Potiha wrote specifically about the CFTC's cross-border approach to margin requirements, but this Note generally applies their arguments to the SEC's entire cross-border approach. Also, Greene and Potiha both contribute scholarship and work in private practice and are, therefore, not full-time academics. See id. at 271.
188. See Greene, supra note 185, at 90-91. 189. Id. This assessment could be done by either a "forest" (generalized) approach or a strict rule-by-rule comparison. Id.
190. Id. 191. Id. Greene believes that a strict rule-by-rule comparison of a jurisdiction's regulations, followed by harmonization of those regulations, would be "indistinguishable from a requirement of regulatory convergence," or two jurisdictions creating requirements in tandem. Id. at 91. He disavows this approach both because Americans should "take pride" in their system and because harmonization frustrates a main purpose of any substituted therefore, can go further than substituted compliance, since two jurisdictions can converge regulations. 192 For example, if regulators at the SEC and in the European Union conformed the margin requirements for SBSs, then counterparties would calculate and maintain the same levels of funds to comply with both jurisdictions. 193 Harmonization also could be achieved through the implementation of transactional standards by supranational regulators. 194 In the context of OTC derivatives, this may require an international body to set minimum requirements for counterparties. 195 Minimum requirements through harmonization would decrease risks of competition, duplication, and fragmentation. 196 In either form of harmonization, however, the objectives of substituted compliance are also accomplished, as SBS counterparties would be subject to only one regulatory scheme. 197 
b. Mutual Recognition
Conceptually, "mutual recognition" 198 is substantially similar to substituted compliance. Edward F. Greene and Ilona Potiha ultimately believe mutual recognition, rather than harmonization, is the correct approach to cross-border regulatory issues in the United States. 199 Recognition can be unilateral or mutual between jurisdictions. 200 Mutual recognition by one government, "unilateral recognition," would result in one jurisdiction determining another's regulations are equivalent to its own and, therefore, that no further regulation is required on its part. 201 Greene and Potiha also enumerate risks associated with the territorial approach to cross-border transactions. 202 Mutual recognition would alleviate some of these risks by removing duplicative regulations from cross-border transactions, discouraging regulatory arbitrage, and promoting compliance regime. Id. Namely, he believes it frustrates the "race to optimality" goal that comes from regulatory experimentation. Greene and Potiha argue that harmonization is unlikely to ever reach its theoretical goals, however, because regulators will not set their own requirements quickly enough to prevent counterparties from becoming uncompetitive and losing clients. See id. at 309 n.166.
197. See id. at 308 (describing harmonization as a framework "under which the rules can operate across borders without unduly restricting cross-border activity and flow of funds").
198. Mutual recognition involves a determination by one jurisdiction that another jurisdiction's regulatory regime is sufficient to regulate counterparties from that jurisdiction without additional regulation by the host country regulator. Id. at 310.
199. Id. at 310-11. As discussed, Greene and Potiha use the SEC's prior substituted compliance determination as an example of mutual recognition. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
200. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310. 201. Id. 202. Id. at 299-304. These include competitive disadvantages, driving business away, duplicative requirements, and market fragmentation. Id. If the market for SBSs were to leave the United States, it could deprive the SEC of oversight over the market. a more coordinated approach to regulation. 203 It also encourages some differences between laws, as jurisdictions need only find each other's laws "equivalent." 204 Thus, the SEC's and European Union's margin requirements could be equivalent, even though counterparties in the European Union hold funds for capital requirements in their own accounts as opposed to the accounts of a third-party custodian under the SEC's requirements. 205 Implementing a mutual recognition scheme, however, would be difficult given the technical nature of comparing regimes. 206 It also is uncertain whether mutual recognition is possible, given that the rationale behind the SEC's territorial approach is the systematic prevention of contagion and interconnected risk. 207 This rationale creates a "tension" because mutual recognition relies on deferring to foreign laws and governments. 208 Mutual recognition of foreign regulations by American agencies would, ultimately, promote the efficiency of cross-border markets by removing duplicative requirements. 209 
c. Not Maxi-, but Minilateralism
Professor John C. Coffee Jr. proposes an alternative approach to substituted compliance. 210 He believes the costs of substituted compliance may outweigh the benefits. 211 Instead, Coffee argues that successful international collaboration among governments can be achieved through a "minilateral" approach to financial regulation. 212 Coffee compares the territorial approach of American regulators to imperialism, which will be resisted in other parts of the world. 213 However, the accepted approach of 203. Id. at 310. Mutual recognition would, presumably, decrease regulatory arbitrage if it was implemented on a large scale but may increase it if implemented only on a smaller scale. It would also, however, include an enforcement mechanism not necessarily included in the harmonization context. Id.
204. Id. These small differences would allow the benefits of the "race to optimality" of regulation described by Edward F. Greene contagion. 222 These commenters are usually financial industry accountability groups 223 that desire enforcement of financial laws. 224 First, they argue that foreign OTC derivatives laws may not be sufficiently equivalent to American laws to support substituted compliance. 225 "Even regimes of comparable robustness" will contain asymmetries that could generate loopholes, and financial companies are "notorious" for finding and exploiting these loopholes. 226 For example, financial companies may create subsidiaries in different jurisdictions to take advantage of different laws. 227 Second, even if foreign laws are sufficiently similar to American laws, the Commission has not done enough to ensure that foreign laws are enforced similarly. 228 The SEC makes only "passing reference" to foreign enforcement when it should consider other factors. 229 Enforcement of existing laws, therefore, concerns these commenters because the laws are meaningless without their enforcement. 230 Third, they argue that Congress chose not to establish substituted compliance in Dodd-Frank. 231 They also criticize the SEC's process for substituted compliance, arguing it is not public or transparent enough, and that only after its scheme is subject to more rigorous standards can the Commission have "adequate legal or policy justification" for substituted compliance. 232 In addition, they criticize the outcomes-based approach. 233 The SEC should use the more "narrow" rule-by-rule comparison approach, which will ensure long-term comparability, rather than the "overly vague" outcomes test. 234 
C. One Size of OTC Derivatives Regulation Does Not Fit All
A substituted compliance determination deems the laws of another jurisdiction essentially equivalent to, or uniform with, those of the SEC. 235 Professor Sean Griffith argues against uniform global regulation for OTC derivatives. 236 Providing for a diversity of regulatory approaches offers benefits otherwise unavailable in a uniform system. 237 To address systemic risk, governments must understand that regulators not only make mistakes but also often repeat them. 238 A diversity of approaches would allow for compartmentalization of risks as regulators in different jurisdictions impose different requirements. 239 This would create the inverse of regulatory arbitrage: regulators would innovate requirements that stem risk and provide information about successful approaches rather than opening their borders to companies seeking the least regulation, fueling a race toward the regulatory bottom. 240 This could, for example, prevent contagions of the sort that spread to American markets through a British subsidiary of AIG. 241 Regulators around the world, working independently, would pull global regulation upward by creating structural barriers to contagion and risk. 242 In comparison, Griffith believes substituted compliance leads to two questions: "[W]hat is sufficiently similar? And . . . who decides?" 243 Whichever regulatory bodies make the determinations, they should consider whether the foreign laws increase systemic risk or undermine the U.S. financial system in some other way. 244 be whether the laws of another jurisdiction are functionally equivalent but whether they provide a "robust approach to the underlying problem of systemic risk." 245 
III. A NARROW AND NECESSARY COMPROMISE
To address the issue surveyed in Part II, this Note proposes that the SEC follow the general path of the CFTC 246 and institute substituted compliance. Because many large financial companies transact in both swaps and SBSs, 247 they currently operate under two different approaches to crossborder transactions for economically equivalent products. 248 Economic efficiency would be increased if these inconsistent approaches were remedied through substituted compliance.
The SEC's substituted compliance policy, however, should be narrower in form than that of the CFTC. It should grant substituted compliance for European dealers, and American dealers with European subsidiaries, transacting in cross-border OTC SBSs. This approach would not only fulfill the purposes of Dodd-Frank but also protect against global systemic risk while maintaining the competitiveness of American financial companies. 249 This resolution is presented in two parts. Part III.A, argues that substituted compliance should be allowed solely for dealers, while Part III.B argues that the European Union is the only jurisdiction for which the SEC should allow substituted compliance.
A. Why Not Substituted Compliance for All Market Participants?
Although substituted compliance can create benefits and prevent issues in the SBS markets and the American economy, the risk of another financial crisis should prevent the SEC's extension of substituted compliance beyond dealers. To develop this argument, Part III.A.1 discusses the benefits of allowing substituted compliance for dealers. Part III.A.2 then presents the potential risks of the SEC not allowing it for dealers, before ending with why the SEC should not allow substituted compliance for other market participants.
245. Id. 246. If the Commission undertakes substituted compliance, it will be different in form from the CFTC's scheme. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
247. See Thompson, supra note 53. 248. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 4 (citing the uncertainties, confusion, and inefficiencies of the differences between the CFTC and SEC).
249. This Note adopts a similar position to that of Professor Coffee, see supra Part II.A.2.c, but one that differs significantly in form and reasoning, see infra Part III.B.
The Economy, Stupid
Large financial institutions, such as dealers in the SBS market, are typically identified as "the cause" of the financial crisis. 250 They carry massive influence over the market by selling vast quantities of OTC SBSs. 251 Indeed, they amplified the damage of the financial crisis by exposing markets around the world to SBSs. 252 As discussed, substituted compliance for SBS dealers would allow them to avoid costly regulatory requirements and would, therefore, benefit them. 253 It would be a conspicuous advantage to a group responsible for fundamental causes of the financial crisis. 254 The SEC, however, should ultimately harmonize 255 with the CFTC, and institute substituted compliance. 256 First, if the SEC granted substituted compliance for another jurisdiction, it affirms that jurisdiction has requirements equivalent to those of Dodd-Frank. 257 The protections DoddFrank mandates to prevent another financial crisis would, therefore, exist. 258 Second, current duplicative requirements put American dealers at a competitive disadvantage in the market. 259 The SEC exempted all but the largest dealers of SBSs from its requirements anyway, through the minimum thresholds for registration. 260 These dealers have the resources to avoid SEC regulations by taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage. 261 Alternatively, if the SEC prevents regulatory arbitrage, American dealers may decide SBSs are too costly because of the Commission's regulations. 262 Dealers would leave the market to create and sell less regulated, more profitable products. 263 In either scenario, the liquidity of the SBS market would diminish, and "fragmentation" would occur. 264 As a result, counterparties would be less able to mitigate risks through hedging. 265 Their trading profits through speculation also would be limited. 266 This would be in addition to the losses of SBS profits as counterparties left the market due to regulatory costs. Finally, the SEC would have less regulatory oversight in a fragmented market or a market in which a substantial number of American SBS dealers exit. Whether through the SBS market or not, large financial companies are inextricably connected to other financial companies throughout the world. 267 As long as the SBS market persists without sufficient oversight, American companies and, therefore, the American economy, will be exposed to its risks through the exposure of American financial companies to foreign financial companies in the numerous other financial markets. 268 
What Could Be Lost Without Substituted Compliance
Some argue the economic benefit provided by American SBS dealers is dwarfed by the importance of what is mandated by Dodd-Frank. 269 Despite the damage of the financial crisis, hedging is fundamental to risk management for financial companies, and cross-border SBSs are necessary to provide market liquidity for hedging. 270 That is why the G20 leaders elected to regulate SBSs rather than ban them. 271 Though some downplay the economic benefits of SBSs, these benefits could be significantly reduced by the regulatory burdens of Dodd-Frank. 272 Furthermore, the loss of American SBS dealers is a risk that could harm the economy further. 273 If the SEC both diminished the liquidity of the SBS market, and effectively ceded jurisdiction over the market, it could undermine Dodd-Frank. 274 These issues would be avoided through substituted compliance, as would the image of American regulatory imperialism. 275 Substituted compliance would strike a regulatory balance between economic benefits and risk protections. 276 Given the advantages substituted compliance creates for the American economy, the SEC could grant it broadly to purchasers of SBSs. 277 The Commission denied this possibility in its initial guidance on substituted compliance, 278 and it should not extend substituted compliance to all market participants at this time. First, if smaller purchasers exit the market because of regulatory costs, it will not harm market liquidity or shrink the American economy as much as an exit of large dealers. 279 Second, though large financial companies can be publicly unpopular, they have more incentive to comply with SEC regulations, or equivalent foreign laws, than SBS participants. Large financial firms have visible brands and reputations based on public perception of compliance with laws and regulations that smaller and less well-known counterparties do not have. 280 Finally, the absence of regulation was a cause of the financial crisis, and granting substituted compliance to all participants could cede oversight for relatively minimal economic benefits. 281 
B. If the European Union, Why Not the World?
The SEC, in striking the correct regulatory balance, could capture most of the SBS market through a substituted compliance determination with the European Union. 282 This is possible because almost all of the large dealers are based in either of the two jurisdictions, 283 and most SBSs are between two dealers. 284 Moreover, the current E.U. SBS laws are equivalent to American requirements for dealers using the approach stated by the SEC. 285 Through this limited action, the Commission could provide many of the benefits advocated for in Part II, while avoiding many of the risks of its territorial approach. 286 Part III.B.1 argues for the equivalence of E.U. laws to SEC regulations. Following this, Part III.B.2 analyzes why there are no enforcement issues with the European Union. Finally, Part III.B.3 explains why the SEC need not make any other substituted compliance determinations.
Existing Equivalence
As discussed, the SEC's outcomes-based approach 287 has been criticized as vague 288 and has never been applied in any public statement by the Commission. 289 After applying the approach as described by the Commission, however, the European Union's information reporting and recordkeeping requirements for SBS dealers are functionally equivalent to the SEC's current regulations under Dodd-Frank. 290 This would leave only capital and margin requirements for a substituted compliance determination. 291 As discussed, the European capital requirements are the only requirements enacted between both governments for either capital or margin. 292 It would be in the best interests of the European Union, the SEC, and counterparties for the two governments to coordinate regulation in efforts that resembled mutual recognition and make them functionally equivalent. 293 These efforts also would affirm the SEC's commitment to coordination with foreign regulators. 294 Based on SEC guidance and the current state of European and American capital and margin requirements, however, they are functionally equivalent.
These Equivalent Laws Will Be Enforced
Even if European SBS laws were equivalent to American laws, however, there would need to be equivalent enforcement of them. 295 The preliminary hurdle in equivalent enforcement is the discretion member states have to implement directives. 296 If member states implement softer versions, the enforcement of directives would differ, and the possibility of regulatory arbitrage between member states would increase. 297 There are mechanisms in the European Union, however, to prevent this from occurring. First, the level of discretion afforded member states differs on a directive-bydirective basis. 298 The pertinent directives at issue in this Note afford little discretion to E.U. member states in implementation. 299 Additionally, none of them have provisions that allow member states to opt out of directives, 300 and these regulations and directives have enforcement provisions. 301 The European Union also has pan-European legislation to ensure proper financial regulation, 302 and it already had OTC derivatives regulations in MiFID 1 prior to the financial crisis, when the United States had none. 303 There are also political and economic pressures between the United States and European Union that help ensure equivalent enforcement. The European Union is one of the only other jurisdictions that suffered economic consequences from the financial crisis as harsh as the United States. 304 It also has similar levels of financial and economic development as the United States 305 and is a close political and economic ally of the United States. Finally, American and European regulators already consult on SBS regulations. 306 
European and American Market Influence
Substituted compliance between the SEC and European Union would capture the majority of global SBSs within the ambit of Dodd-Frank. The two jurisdictions regulate the majority of the world's large dealers. 307 These dealers are the largest financial institutions in the world and have vast resources in an industry with high regulatory barriers to entry. 308 It is, therefore, unlikely that dealers would develop rapidly in jurisdictions outside of regime's scope. 309 Again, substituted compliance between the SEC and the European Union would accomplish sound regulation with limited Commission action. 310 Given the two jurisdictions' political and economic ties, the ongoing regulatory dialogue also would likely ensure flexibility to address any necessary changes in the future. 311 Additionally, many of the incentives for substituted compliance with the European Union do not exist for other jurisdictions, and, therefore, the Commission should not make any other determinations. First, it is not clear that any other jurisdictions have SBS laws equivalent to the American laws, like the European Union does. 312 Second, no other jurisdiction has the density of large SBS dealers. 313 Third, the SEC risks undermining DoddFrank, 314 criticism from the public or Congress, and litigation with any determination. 315 Fourth, the close political and economic ties of the United States and European Union do not exist with every jurisdiction in the world. 316 Therefore, it is harder to rely on the enforcement of equivalent laws, or trust other governments to act in a coordinated manner. Other governments also may tailor their SBS laws to Dodd-Frank without any further Commission action. If the SEC and E.U. regulators acknowledge a shared framework, it would establish it as the leading standard internationally. 317 Jurisdictions may adopt a similar framework as an attempt to not only properly regulate markets but also create the potential for substituted compliance with the SEC. 318 Regardless of whether other jurisdictions match their laws to Dodd-Frank, foreign dealers will continue to transact in the United States and Europe out of necessity. 319 The United States and European Union have the largest capital markets in the world, 320 and transactions will continue because of precedent. Other jurisdictions could choose to benefit from regulatory arbitrage, 321 but it is unlikely given the discussed motivations and the nature of the SBS market. Finally, if regulators around the world are left to create individual systems, it could provide the compartmentalization of risks brought by regulatory diversity. 322 
CONCLUSION
The ruin inflicted by the financial crisis cannot be overstated. Average people who had not participated in the opaque SBS market bore much of the financial brunt. 323 The motivations of the G20 to enact legislation like Dodd-Frank were commendable. 324 The unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank, however, threaten to erode existing benefits of the financial markets. Given the financial crisis, the global financial markets are better served if the SEC maintains as much oversight as is politically and economically expedient.
Through substituted compliance with the European Union, the SEC would uphold the goals of Dodd-Frank while preventing excessive regulation and protecting the competitiveness of the American economy.
317. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1288 (stating that the United States and European Union could "notify other countries (e.g., Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Brazil) as to the minimum requirements that they would require to consider another regulatory regime functionally equivalent").
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